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Northern and southeastern Virginians will
vote in referenda this November to approve or
reject increases in the retail sales tax to fund
transportation projects. Northern Virginians
will decide whether to increase the sales tax from
4.5 percent to 5.0 percent, an 11 percent
increase. Virginians in the Hampton Roads area
will decide whether to increase the sales tax from
4.5 percent to 5.5 percent, a 22 percent increase.
Proponents of tax increases point to unmet
transportation needs to support their cause. Yet
state spending increased 13 percent in 1999, 7
percent in 2000, and 9 percent in 2001. If key
transportation needs have not been met, the
problem is not a lack of funds but legislators who
have not properly prioritized the budget.
If the sales tax referenda are passed, the state
government will have a strong incentive to
reduce what it would otherwise spend on trans-
portation in northern Virginia and Hampton
Roads. By some measures, northern Virginia
already gets the short end of the stick with
regard to the state budget.
Tax increases are not just bad budget policy;
they are also bad economic policy. Since higher
taxes reduce economic growth, an added cost of
higher sales taxes would be lower incomes for
Virginians. During the 1990s Virginia taxes grew
faster than incomes, and local property taxes have
soared recently.
Even modest restraint in nontransportation
spending could save enough money to fund pri-
ority highway projects without tax increases.
Further, the state could adopt a spending
growth cap that channels excess future tax rev-
enues to transportation needs and tax cuts.
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Introduction
Citizens of northern Virginia will vote this
November on a proposal to raise the general
sales tax rate in that region from 4.5 to 5.0 per-
cent, an 11 percent increase.1 In southeastern
Virginia, or Hampton Roads, citizens will vote
on a similar proposal to raise the sales tax in
that region from 4.5 percent to 5.5 percent, a
22 percent increase.2 The proceeds from those
tax increases and subsequent bond issues are
to be used for transportation projects only in
those areas paying the higher taxes.
The ballot questions are one-sided, as they
only allow a tax increase option, not an option
to control state spending to free funds for
transportation. Ironically, the Virginia political
establishment has long been opposed to popu-
lar referenda, but this year elected officials have
allowed citizens to vote only for an increase in
the size of the government. The last significant
referendum on taxes was a 1987 Fairfax County
vote on increasing the restaurant meals tax to
fund education. That referendum was defeated. 
In 2003 state transportation spending of
$3.3 billion will be funded from a remarkably
complex array of taxes and fees.3 (All budget
data are for state fiscal years, which end on June
30). Major funding sources include federal
grants, half of a percentage point of the state’s
general sales tax, a gasoline tax of 17.5 cents per
gallon, a motor vehicle sales tax of 3 percent,
motor vehicle license fees, and many other fees
and taxes. The current Virginia general state
sales tax is 3.5 percent, but localities add an
additional 1.0 percent for a total of 4.5 percent. 
The proposed sales tax increases have been
pushed by developers and other business
interests in northern Virginia, led by the
Northern Virginia Roundtable. In a recent
statement, the Roundtable called for increases
in state individual and corporate income
taxes, gasoline taxes, and sales taxes.4 Clearly,
developers directly benefit from expanded
construction funding for highways and mass
transit. Virginia’s governor Mark Warner, who
has long been supported by those groups,
pushed the sales tax referenda through the
legislature and is now campaigning for pas-
sage of the proposed tax increases. 
The sales tax referendum is a classic political
con game. Politicians insist that there is no
money left in the budget for whatever the most
important issue happens to be for voters. If vot-
ers’ top priority is highways, then politicians
insist there is no money left for them and claim
that higher taxes are needed. If voters’ top priori-
ty is education, then politicians insist there is no
money for it without more tax increases. The
reality is that the support for sales tax increases
illustrates the failure of state politicians to live
within their means after large tax revenue and
spending increases during the 1990s.
The sales tax proposals come at a particularly
bad time, as the economic slowdown has
reduced the ability of families and businesses
across the state to pay more taxes. Indeed, sup-
porters of the tax increase face strong grassroots
opposition in Virginia this year. Citizens
opposed to higher taxes, and liberals and envi-
ronmentalists who believe that more highway
construction will lead to more urban sprawl and
pollution, are against the sales tax increases.
If Virginians examine the state budget,
they will find that they already pay more than
enough in taxes to finance all the basic ser-
vices of state government, including roads
and highways. Slowing the growth rate in
overall state spending in future years would
free funds for transportation and allow a full
phase-in of the car tax repeal.
This report discusses 10 reasons why
Virginia does not need a sales tax increase.
Reasons 1 to 9 have to do with the current bud-
get situation in Virginia. Reason 10 is that tax
increases have not only budget implications but
also important economic effects. Since tax
increases reduce economic growth, the sales tax
referenda are about more than funding high-
ways. They are also about preserving Virginia’s
strong economy. Finally, we provide some poli-
cy options that Virginia legislators should con-
sider instead of tax increases. It turns out that
reasonable limitations on general fund spend-
ing growth would leave more than enough
funds for essential transportation projects and
further tax cuts in the years ahead.
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10 Reasons to Oppose a
Sales Tax Increase
1. State Spending Has Grown Excessively
State spending in Virginia soared during the
1990s as the economic boom flooded state cof-
fers with tax revenue and prompted legislators to
expand programs beyond sustainable levels.
During nine boom years from 1992 to 2001,
state spending (general and nongeneral funds)
rose an average of 6.8 percent per year.5 By con-
trast, inflation grew at just 2.6 percent annually
and Virginia’s population grew at 1.2 percent
annually during that period. Figure 1 shows that
recent spending increases have been particularly
large, including increases of 13.3 percent in 1999,
7.0 percent in 2000, and 9.1 percent in 2001.6
Although legislators were forced to slow
spending growth to just 0.7 percent in 2002
because of stagnant tax revenue, they have
enacted a 7 percent increase in spending for
2003. Despite cries of large budget shortfalls,
the May budget plan for the 2003–04 biennium
included more than $2 billion in “new spend-
ing.”7 As soon as politicians anticipate money
coming in the door, new spending projects are
found to expand state government.
Virginia voters should ask why it is that,
after the 1990s spending boom and planned
increases next year, there is no money left to
solve transportation problems in northern
Virginia and Hampton Roads. If transportation
is a top spending priority, legislators and the
governor should begin to reduce spending, or
slow spending growth, in other budget areas in
order to reallocate funds to highway projects.
2. Tax Revenues Rose Quickly during the
1990s
Virginia has a history of fiscal conser-
vatism; its overall tax load has been somewhat
below the average of the 50 states. But in the
late 1990s large tax revenue increases pushed
Virginia closer to the midpoint.8 Unless bud-
get restraints are imposed, Virginia may ulti-
mately lose its low-tax advantage and become
less economically competitive.
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Figure 1
Growth in Virginia Spending vs. Growth in Inflation Plus Virginia Population
Source: Virginia Department of Planning and Budget, www.ddpb.state.va.us/budget/budget.htm.
Notes: Spending is total fiscal year operating budget (general and nongeneral funds). Inflation and popluation
growth are estimated for 2002 and 2003.
In 2003 general fund taxes of $11.2 billion
will fund a bit less than half of the state’s
expenditures of $25.1 billion. The primary
general fund taxes are the individual income
tax, the corporate income tax, and the sales
tax. The other half of state expenditures is
funded by federal grants, fees, and other
taxes. As noted, numerous taxes and fees are
devoted to funding transportation.
General fund tax revenue grew faster than
inflation plus state population every year from
1993 through 2000, as shown in Figure 2.9 In
1998, 1999, and 2000, tax revenue growth
exceeded 10 percent annually.
During the economic boom from 1992
through 2001, tax revenues almost doubled
with an increase of 97 percent. By compari-
son, Virginia’s population rose 12 percent,
and the consumer price index, which mea-
sures inflation, increased 26 percent.
During economic expansions, Virginia’s
tax revenues tend to rise faster than incomes,
thus creating a hidden tax increase. In the
late 1990s revenues from the income tax and
capital gains tax rose particularly quickly. For
citizens to remain in the same position rela-
tive to the government, tax cuts are needed
every few years to return the excess revenues.
As the economy recovers, state coffers will
begin filling up again, so the state govern-
ment simply needs to be patient and focus on
reviving the state’s economy, rather than pur-
sue tax increases that could have the opposite
effect of damaging the recovery.
3. Overall Taxes on Virginians Are Too High
On average, Virginia households pay 31 per-
cent of their income in taxes to the federal, state,
and local governments.10 That makes Virginia
25th among the states in terms of total taxes as a
percentage of income. A decade ago Virginia
ranked 35th among the states by this measure.11
The average Virginia family pays more in
taxes than it spends on food, clothing, and
housing combined.12 This is important because
proponents of tax increases are always quick to
point out the added “needs” of the state budget.
But Virginia citizens have their own needs,
which they have difficulty meeting with only 69
cents on the dollar after taxes. State budget
needs filled by tax increases mean fewer
resources available for Virginia families to use
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Figure 2
Growth in Virginia Tax Revenue vs. Growth in Inflation Plus Virginia Population
Source: Virginia Department of Planning and Budget, www.ddpb.state.va.us/budget/budget.htm.
Note: Inflation and population growth are estimated for 2002 and 2003.
to meet their own needs, thus reducing their
economic freedom.
Figure 3 shows that between 1990 and
2000 state taxes in Virginia increased 92 per-
cent, compared to income growth of 73 per-
cent. Population growth plus inflation in
Virginia grew 45 percent during that period.
Virginia’s tax growth outpaced the 50-state
average by 13 percentage points in the 1990s.
Although state taxes have risen quickly
across the country, Virginia taxes have risen
more quickly than those of most states. The
proposed Virginia sales tax increases would
make the problem of excess tax growth worse
in the years ahead.
Moreover, this tax increase would come on
top of soaring property tax increases in northern
Virginia and other regions. In Fairfax County,
where 1 million northern Virginians live, proper-
ty tax revenues, which soared 8.5 percent in 2001
and 13.2 percent in 2002, will increase 12.6 per-
cent in 2003.13As property values have exploded,
local governments have been flooded with extra
cash from homeowners. For example, Fairfax
County property tax assessments for 2003 went
up an average of 15 percent. Since the chair of the
Fairfax County Board of Supervisors, Kate
Hanley, who said she did not plan to raise taxes,
was reelected in 1999, the annual property tax
bill for the average Fairfax family is up about
$1,000 by one estimate.14
Similar trends have occurred in other
counties. In Loudoun County, tax revenues
on real property soared 63 percent between
1999 and 2002.15 In Arlington County, tax
revenues on real property increased 34 per-
cent in the last three years.16
In addition, the scheduled final elimina-
tion of the car tax in Virginia has been
delayed because of the state’s budget imbal-
ance. This will cost Virginia taxpayers rough-
ly $300 million for every year of delay.17 So
imposing a sales tax increase now would be
piling tax increase on tax increase.
4. The State Budget Can Be Reprioritized
to Fund Transportation
As discussed, state funding for trans-
portation primarily comes from federal grant
money, one-half cent of the state sales tax,
the gasoline tax, and other taxes. In regions
of rapid growth, such as northern Virginia,
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Growth of Taxes, Income, and Population Plus Inflation, 1990–2000
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, government finance data, www.census.gov/govs/www/state.html.
Note: All figures are nominal, or current, dollars.
those revenues may be insufficient to keep up
with growing transportation demands. A
first step toward a solution would be to
change priorities in order to devote more
state transportation funds to faster growing
regions, rather than divert money to slow-
growth regions. Indeed, the state auditor
recently recommended that the state change
the current method of regional allocations of
transportation funds to better fulfill
statewide priorities.18
In addition, the state should begin using
more current general fund revenues to help
finance roads and highways. The state has
started using small amounts of general fund
revenues for transportation through the
Priority Transportation Fund in recent years,
and this policy should be expanded upon.
Unfortunately, the 2003 budget goes in a
reverse direction by raiding $317 million of
transportation monies to fill the general
fund budget gap, instead of cutting general
fund spending.
Since Virginia’s operating budget totaled
more than $23 billion in 2002, 7 percent
planned spending growth in 2003 means a
$1.6 billion increase. By contrast, the pro-
posed sales tax increase in northern Virginia
would raise about $123 million in the first
year.19 Thus, trimming less than 1 percent of
annual growth in the overall budget would
be enough to fund added transportation
needs without a tax increase. In the policy
options section below, we detail how the
excess annual growth in the general fund
would obviate the need for a sales tax
increase by providing funds for transporta-
tion improvements, as well as room for
future tax reductions.
5. The State Budget Is Already Unfair to
Northern Virginia
The current structure of the Virginia bud-
get creates an unfair fiscal balance for north-
ern Virginia. Northern Virginia gets the short
end of the stick when it comes to state aid
and transfers to local governments.
According to professor John Knapp of the
University of Virginia, for every dollar in taxes
that northern Virginia sends to Richmond,
the region gets back only 46 cents in state
aid.20 His calculations show that in 2000
northern Virginians paid about 39 percent of
state taxes, but local governments in north-
ern Virginia received just 18 percent of all
state aid. Thus, it is unfair to ask taxpayers in
northern Virginia to pay more for improved
highways when the state already siphons off
their tax payments to other parts of the state.
Further evidence of the state budget’s
unfairness to northern Virginia is the fact that
the region’s population is 26 percent of the
state total, but it pays about 39 percent of
Virginia’s taxes. Fairfax County alone pays 27
percent of state income taxes but has just 14
percent of the state’s population.21 The state
income tax penalizes residents of northern
Virginia, where both incomes and living
expenses are high. Also, as capital gains tax rev-
enue soared in the 1990s, this extra state cash
intake came at the expense of the high-tech
industry concentrated in northern Virginia.
Northern Virginians should seek a more equal
share of the state budget to help solve the
region’s transportation problems, rather than
impose an additional burden on taxpayers.
6. New Sales Taxes May Cause the State to
Redistribute the Transportation Budget
A big danger of targeted sales tax increas-
es in two regions of the state is that it is like-
ly that the legislature will reduce what would
have otherwise been spent on transportation
in northern Virginia and Hampton Roads in
future years. State transportation money
could be directed to other parts of the state,
or even to nontransportation uses. Other
regions may well argue in the future that
northern Virginia and Hampton Roads have
more than enough transportation funds and
that state money should be spent elsewhere.   
Some state leaders are already telling their
constituents outside the referenda regions to
hope the referenda pass because that will free
more state money for them. Virginia secre-
tary of transportation Whitt Clement told a
crowd in Danville on May 2 that “money
from the sales tax referenda will finance
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transportation projects in those regions.
Failure of the referenda could result in alter-
ations to Virginia’s transportation funding
formulas, thus steering more dollars to areas
of exploding growth. That would be to the
detriment of rural areas.”22 In other words,
Clement said that if the referenda do not
pass, more state money will have to be devot-
ed to northern Virginia and Hampton Roads.
But if the referenda do pass, more state
money can be spent in rural areas.
The problem was even recognized by the
Washington Post, which editorialized that “sup-
porters of the [tax] increase emphasize that it
is not to be a bailout of the state; the legisla-
tion authorizing the referenda prohibits
Virginia from cutting the amounts allocated
to Northern Virginia for road construction.
That may prove hard to police.”23
Furthermore, there is no guarantee that
the increased sales tax revenues will be fully
used for higher transportation spending, on
net. Indeed, the state seems to be going in a
reverse direction with the recent diversion of
half a percentage point of the current sales
tax, which had been used to fund transporta-
tion, to nontransportation purposes. In
2002, $317 million will be diverted.24 The
funds are to be replaced with further
issuance of debt instruments called federal
reimbursement anticipation notes (FRANs),
thus increasing burdens on future taxpayers.
7. Passage of the Referenda Would Spur
Demand for More Tax Increases Later
The state has a habit of understating the
future costs of transportation projects to get as
many started as possible, as noted by the state
auditor.25 After projects are well under way, the
true costs become evident and the state
demands more cash from taxpayers. The feder-
al government plays a similar game with
national defense procurement. In Virginia, the
proposed sales tax increase and related debt
issuance may create the demand for future tax
increases after underfunded long-term projects
are begun. After all, Governor Warner is saying
that the higher taxes will be just a “downpay-
ment on gridlock improvements.”26
A long-planned widening of Lee Highway
(U.S. 29), for example, had been estimated to
cost $85 million.27 The project was dropped by
the Virginia Department of Transportation
earlier this year. But the northern Virginia
sales tax referendum includes the project but
earmarks only $25 million for the job.
Another example is $350 million debt to be
issued for a Dulles corridor railroad line. That
is only about one-tenth of the funds needed to
complete such a project. Once those projects
are started, residents can expect the state to
come back and demand further tax hikes.
Overall, about 40 percent of funds to be
raised in northern Virginia would go to mass
transit rather than highway improvements,
thus not reducing congestion directly, if at
all. For example, the Dulles Toll Road is not
generally congested now, but a new Dulles
rail line could spur further development
along the corridor and add to congestion,
not reduce it. Money would also be devoted
to new rail cars for the Metro and Virginia
Railway Express. Rather than burden north-
ern Virginians with tax increases, users of
those services should pay a greater share of
their own transportation costs.
Another concern is the pro-tax political
effect that would result from passing the
sales tax increase referenda. Voter support for
reducing congestion may be mistaken as sup-
port for higher tax levels. As a result, the leg-
islature may be more receptive to tax increase
proposals in the future if the referenda are
supported. Besides, the general sales tax was
hiked from 4.0 percent to 4.5 percent for
transportation in 1986. Taxpayers were told
then that the tax increase would solve traffic
congestion problems. But it turned out that
the tax increase simply fueled added growth
in state spending.
8. VDOT Should Be Reformed before Its
Budget Is Increased
A recent investigation by the Virginia state
auditor found that VDOT grossly misman-
ages its $3.3 billion budget.28 As the Washington
Post summarized, the auditor “has drawn a
devastating portrait of poor management,
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failing computer systems, irresponsible spend-
ing and sloppy planning.”29 For example, state
figures show that in the past three years trans-
portation construction cost estimates aver-
aged 86 percent higher at contract award than
when projects were originally conceived.30
Governor Warner says he will take steps to
fix those problems. But it would be prudent
to spend a few years creating a leaner and
more efficient transportation operation in
the state before hundreds of millions of new
dollars are sent into VDOT’s fiscal black
hole. Adding new money now would reduce
the incentive for much-needed reforms. 
Although a new Northern Virginia
Transportation Authority has been established
to manage the new sales tax funds, that author-
ity will not have the manpower or expertise to
handle the actual road building. In the public
sector, only VDOT has the capability to build
and manage the highway projects funded by
sales tax increases.31 But rewarding poor perfor-
mance with new funds is the wrong way to
manage any agency, public or private.
9. Increasing Virginia’s Debt Is Bad Fiscal
Policy
Passing the proposed sales tax increases
may result in increases in other taxes down the
road as Virginia’s debt load increases and bor-
rowing costs rise. The referendum in northern
Virginia would allow $2.8 billion in bonds to
be issued, and the Hampton Roads referen-
dum would allow $5.9 billion in bonds.
The bonds would be issued by special trans-
portation authorities in each region. Only the
new sales tax revenues are to be used to pay
interest and principal on the bonds. Since the
revenue available to pay for the bonds is limited,
the bonds will be riskier for investors, and the
state may have to pay higher interest rates than
it does on normal state bonds.
However, state taxpayers in general may
ultimately be at risk for the bonds if sales tax
revenues are insufficient to cover bond pay-
ments. That could occur if an economic slow-
down reduces sales tax receipts. The state
would probably not let the bonds default
because that would be an embarrassment
and threaten the state’s high bond rating. So,
while only new sales tax revenues are to be
used to service the bonds, that could be
amended in the future to make all state tax-
payers responsible. 
Additional bond issuance could affect
both the state’s and local governments’ cred-
it ratings, even without a default. The added
risk caused by billions of dollars of new debt
for transportation may lead to higher inter-
est rates on other government debt. Local
governments could be affected because bond
agencies consider the total debt load of com-
munities when evaluating local debt issues.
As a general rule, debt financing should be a
tightly controlled method of state government
financing. That is because debt makes it easy for
legislators to unfairly push costs onto future
generations. Bond financing, particularly bond
financing under special authorities, is danger-
ous because the costs are hidden from the tax-
payers. Transportation financing in Virginia is
already terribly confusing, as is the proliferation
of bond financing techniques. Adding further
special regional debt mechanisms will create
more headaches for citizens seeking to under-
stand their state government.
As noted, the proliferation of debt evades
tough budget choices by pushing costs onto
future taxpayers. A recent example was the
maneuver to divert to the general fund the
proceeds of the half cent of the general sales
tax that is supposed to fund transportation.
This $317 million of transportation money
will be replaced by the fancy FRANs debt
device. In the current six-year transportation
plan, Virginia proposes issuing $659 million
in new FRANs.32 FRAN issuance began in
2000 with $375 million of debt issues.33The
state auditor recently warned that FRANs
provide cash in the short term but “can actu-
ally make the cash flow situation worse in the
future.”34 FRAN debt service will rise from
5.7 percent of federal transportation money
in 2002 to 24 percent by 2005.35 State trans-
portation debt service is an increasing share
of state revenue, which suggests that the bil-
lions of dollars of new debt issuance pro-
posed under the referenda is unwise.
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10. Tax Increases Reduce Economic Growth
A growing number of economic studies
indicate that regions with high taxes have
slower economic growth than regions with
lower taxes. Capital, labor, and consumers in
search of the best economic climates are
increasingly mobile across both state and
international borders. As a result, govern-
ments must maximize their efficiency and not
let their tax rates get out of line with those of
neighboring jurisdictions.36 Tax increases will
result in fewer businesses, slower economic
growth, and a shrinking tax base. 
If sales taxes in Virginia rise, consumers
buying expensive items will have an added
incentive to do business in sales tax–free
Delaware or elsewhere. Virginia would also
undermine its current advantage in compari-
son with surrounding states that have higher
sales taxes. In addition, regional sales tax
increases would put northern Virginia and
Hampton Roads at a tax disadvantage in
comparison with other areas within Virginia. 
Table 1 provides data comparing economic
growth and state and local tax levels in the 10
highest-tax jurisdictions and the 10 lowest-tax
jurisdictions. The tax measure used in the
analysis is average 1980–99 state and local tax
revenues as a percentage of personal income.37
Economic growth is measured as the increase
in real, or inflation-adjusted, state personal
income during the 19-year period. The results
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Taxes as a Percentage of Income, Change in Personal Income,
Jurisdiction Average 1980–99 Real Increase 1980–99
Highest-tax jurisdictions
Alaska 18.6% 46%
D.C. 13.7% 27%
New York 13.6% 57%
Wyoming 11.6% 12%
Maine 11.6% 61%
Hawaii 11.5% 45%
Minnesota 11.4% 72%
Wisconsin 11.3% 48%
New Mexico 11.1% 71%
Vermont 11.0% 70%
Average 12.5% 51%
Lowest-tax jurisdictions
South Dakota 9.2% 61%
Indiana 9.0% 48%
Virginia 9.0% 85%
Nevada 8.9% 191%
Texas 8.9% 86%
Missouri 8.8% 55%
Florida 8.6% 110%
Alabama 8.4% 61%
Tennessee 8.2% 81%
New Hampshire 7.9% 103%
Average 8.7% 88%
Table 1
State and Local Taxes vs. Income Growth, 1980–99
Source: Authors’ calculations based on U.S. Bureau of the Census data.
show that average real income growth was 51
percent during the period for the 10 highest-
tax jurisdictions but 88 percent for the 10 low-
est-tax jurisdictions.
Other studies have found a similar rela-
tionship between taxes and economic
growth. A 1995 study by the Joint Economic
Committee of the U.S. Congress looked at
state taxes and personal income growth from
1960 to 1993. The study concluded that
“higher state and local taxes had a distinct
and significant negative effect on personal
income growth. . . . That is, when state and
local taxes were raised, personal income
growth slowed markedly. By the same token,
states with lower taxes enjoyed substantially
higher personal income growth.”38Relatively
low-tax states grew nearly one-third faster
than high-tax states, according to the study.
A 1996 study by Zsolt Becsi of the Federal
Reserve Bank of Atlanta looked at state and
local taxes compared with state income
growth from 1960 to 1992. The study found
that incomes in the poorer states tended to
slowly catch up to incomes in the wealthier
states over time. When the study controlled
for that factor, it found that tax rates were
negatively related to economic growth dur-
ing the period. The results held true for both
marginal tax rates and overall state and local
tax levels.39
At the international level, a recent survey
of academic studies on investment by James
Hines of the University of Michigan Business
School concludes that taxation significantly
influences the location of foreign direct
investment, research and development, and
other activities that promote economic
growth.40 Similarly, a recent International
Monetary Fund study found “strong evi-
dence” that foreign direct investment flows
were affected by taxes.41 Another IMF study
found that each increase in taxes of 1 percent
of gross domestic product would reduce
worker output by about 2 percent.42 A study
by Eric Engen and Jonathan Skinner pub-
lished by the National Bureau of Economic
Research looked at growth rates of 107 coun-
tries from 1970 to 1985 and found “strong
and negative effects of both government
spending and taxation on output growth.”43
Low state-level taxes have also been found
to be a significant factor in the location of
investment flowing into the United States. A
recent study by Professor Deborah Swenson of
the University of California–Davis found that
U.S. states with higher taxes attract fewer new
investments and plant expansions from for-
eign corporations than do lower-tax states.44
In summary, Virginians need to consider
that proposals for tax increases are not just
about whether the state government “needs”
more funds for transportation. Tax increases
are likely to damage economic growth over
the long run. As a consequence, alternatives
should be found to meet the priority trans-
portation needs of Virginia without the neg-
ative economic side effects of tax hikes.
Policy Options
Limit General Fund Spending Growth
In the 1990s Virginia general fund spend-
ing rose much faster than the sum of the
growth rate of inflation plus Virginia’s popu-
lation. Spending growth that keeps pace with
the growth of inflation plus population is a
baseline that keeps per capita real spending
constant. If future general fund spending
growth were limited to this baseline, excess
revenues would be generated that could be
devoted to transportation and tax reductions.
Table 2 compares two transportation
funding alternatives with the proposed tax
increase in northern Virginia. To be conserv-
ative, we have assumed under both options
that future tax revenues grow at 5.0 percent,
which is less than the average annual tax
growth of 5.7 percent from 1990 to 2002, a
period that included two recessions. Under
Option A, a relatively small transfer of 1 per-
cent of general fund taxes—a fraction of
annual revenue growth—would be earmarked
for transportation. That would raise a bit less
revenue ($649 million) during the first five
years than the proposed sales tax increase
would ($728 million).
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Under Option B, general fund spending
would be capped at baseline growth of popu-
lation plus inflation, assumed here to be 4
percent based on historical experience.45 The
difference between revenue growth and the
spending cap would grow substantially over
time. During the first five years, a general
fund spending cap would generate about
$1.9 billion. That would provide funding for
transportation projects in northern Virginia
and Hampton Roads and money for Virginia
taxpayer refunds. If tax revenue growth aver-
ages 6 percent annually in future years, such
a spending cap would generate even more
funds for tax reductions.
In addition to freeing resources for trans-
portation and tax cuts, an overall general
fund spending cap would prevent an overex-
pansion of state government during eco-
nomic boom periods. If Virginia lawmakers
were obligated to refund excess funds to tax-
payers during booms, they would be
restrained from starting new programs and
expanding bureaucracies that could not be
supported during slowdowns. 
Currently, 26 state governments operate
under some sort of tax or expenditure limita-
tion.46 Those limitations vary widely in effec-
tiveness. Colorado’s Taxpayer Bill of Rights
(TABOR), in place since 1992, is probably the
most successful. TABOR limits growth of
state tax revenues to inflation plus popula-
tion growth. Revenue increases above the
limit are refunded to taxpayers. In addition,
TABOR requires that any state or local tax
increase be approved by the voters.
The legislature can allow revenues and
spending to increase faster than the limit,
but it must first get the approval of voters in
a referendum. Six such referenda have been
held in Colorado since TABOR was adopted,
and the public has rejected five of them.
TABOR has been popular and beneficial for
Colorado and produced rebates totaling $2.3
billion from 1997 through 2000.47
If a TABOR-style limit was in place in
Virginia, it would generate excess funds that
could be used for transportation and taxpayer
refunds. For example, if tax revenues rose 8 per-
cent in one year and the spending growth cap
was 4 percent, $448 million would be generat-
ed, given that current general fund revenues are
$11.2 billion. If that were all returned to taxpay-
ers, it would work out to a tax refund of about
$160 for every Virginia household.
Private Financing Options for
Transportation
Numerous state governments are turning
to private financing of new highways and
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ing economic
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Option A: Option B Northern Va.
General Fund 1% of General General Fund Excess for Revenues under
Tax Revenue Fund Taxes for Spending Capped Transportation Proposed Sales
Fiscal Year Growth at 5% Transportation at 4% and Tax Cuts Tax Increase
2003 11,181 11,181
2004 11,740 117 11,628 112 123
2005 12,327 123 12,093 234 140
2006 12,943 129 12,577 366 147
2007 13,591 136 13,080 510 155
2008 14,270 143 13,603 667 163
2004–08 $649 $1,889 $728 
Table 2
Options for Earmarking Excess Tax Revenue Growth to Fund Transportation in
Northern Virginia ($ millions)
Source: Authors’ assumptions and calculations.
other transportation infrastructure as an
option to help solve congestion. Innovative
privately financed projects have been pursued
in Virginia, California, Texas, North Carolina,
South Carolina, and other states.48 The private
Dulles Greenway, a 14-mile extension of the
Dulles Toll Road, was opened in 1995. It was
financed through bonds and private equity
and uses an electronic toll system to maximize
efficiency for drivers. In Richmond the 895
Connector project, which will also use elec-
tronic toll technology, is being financed by pri-
vate capital in a nonprofit structure. 
Fluor Daniel, a leading engineering com-
pany, has proposed using private funding to
widen the Capital Beltway by four lanes in
northern Virginia.49 The “high-occupancy
toll” lanes would be separated from the regu-
lar lanes and fitted with electronic technolo-
gies for toll paying. While there may be
numerous policy reasons to oppose this par-
ticular project, it shows that private financ-
ing is available for transportation projects as
an alternative to tax hikes and (mis)manage-
ment of funds by VDOT. 
Private financing and operation should be
as part of the solution to Virginia’s trans-
portation needs. That would allow Virginia
families to avoid tax hikes and allow the state
to retain its low-tax competitiveness. In addi-
tion, taxpayers could avoid having even more
money wasted by a mismanaged state trans-
portation agency, and northern Virginians
would reduce the risk that their highway dol-
lars were flowing to other parts of the state.
Conclusion
Virginia should devote more of the taxes
that citizens already pay to priority trans-
portation projects in northern Virginia and
Hampton Roads. That would be feasible if
the state earmarked a small additional por-
tion of general fund taxes for transportation
or adopted an overall cap on general fund
spending growth. In particular, Virginia
should consider a budget cap, similar to the
successful TABOR restraint in Colorado,
that allows general fund spending to grow no
faster than the rate of inflation plus popula-
tion growth. 
As the economy recovers and tax revenues
grow, the surplus above a budget cap would be
greater than monies that would be raised
through a sales tax hike. Excess revenues gen-
erated by such a cap could also be used for tax
refunds. A budget cap would have the added
benefit of preventing the state government
from overexpanding during boom years.
In summary, Virginia’s transportation
funding needs could be addressed without
the negative effects of sales tax increases.
Indeed, the proposed tax increases illustrate
the failure of state politicians to properly pri-
oritize spending. Given that northern
Virginia’s economy has been hit by the
national economic slowdown and the high-
tech collapse in particular, tax increases
would come at a particularly bad time.
Virginia has prospered because it is a relative-
ly low-tax state. It is to be hoped that it will
remain so.
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